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..the first important notions in topology were
acquired in the course of the study of polyhedra.
H. Lebesgue
Résumé : Dans son inﬂuent Proofs and Refutations (Preuves et Réfutations),
Lakatos introduit les méthodes de preuves et de réfutations en discutant l’his-
toire et le développement de la formule V −E+F = 2 d’Euler pour les polyèdres
en 3 dimensions. Lakatos croyait, en eﬀet, que l’histoire du polyèdre présentait
un bon exemple pour sa philosophie et sa méthodologie des mathématiques,
incluant la géométrie. Le présent travail met l’accent sur les propriétés mathé-
matiques et topologiques qui sont incorporées dans l’approche méthodologique
de Lakatos. Pour chaque exemple et contre-exemple utilisé par Lakatos, nous
présenterons brièvement sa contrepartie topologique, ce qui nous permettra de
présenter les fondations et les motivations mathématiques derrière sa philoso-
phie de la méthodologie des mathématiques et ﬁnalement, par ce fait même,
nous développerons certaines intuitions sur le fonctionnement de ses notions
d’heuristique négative et d’heuristique positive.
Abstract: Lakatos’s seminal work Proofs and Refutations introduced the
methods of proofs and refutations by discussing the history and methodolog-
ical development of Euler’s formula V − E + F = 2 for three dimensional
polyhedra. Lakatos considered the history of polyhedra illustrating a good ex-
ample for his philosophy and methodology of mathematics and geometry. In
this study, we focus on the mathematical and topological properties which
play a role in Lakatos’s methodological approach. For each example and
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counterexample given by Lakatos, we brieﬂy outline its topological counter-
part. We thus present the mathematical background and basis of Lakatos’s
philosophy of mathematical methodology in the case of Euler’s formula, and
thereby develop some intuitions about the function of his notions of positive
and negative heuristics.
1 Introduction
Lakatos’s inﬂuential work Proofs and Refutations (PR, afterwards), ﬁrst pub-
lished in the British Journal of Philosophy of Science in four parts between
1963 and 1964, introduced many new concepts to both philosophy and the
methodology of mathematics. From these we focus here on the concept of
heuristics. We analyze the heuristics employed in PR by focusing on the coun-
terexamples discussed in the original work.
PR introduced the methods of proofs and refutations by discussing the
history and methodological development of Euler’s formula V −E+F = 2 for
three dimensional polyhedra, where V,E and F are the number of vertices,
edges and faces respectively. Lakatos considered the history of polyhedra to be
a good example for illustrating his philosophy and methodology of mathemat-
ics and geometry. There are several reasons for this. The ﬁrst is the fact that
the history of Euler’s formula spans the paradigm shift from the Cauchyian
analytic school to the Poincaréian topological school, and thus is a natural
illustration for theory change. The second such reason is that Lakatos’s expo-
sition of Euler’s formula is a “rationally reconstructed” account of the subject
matter, therefore diverging from the actual history in certain respects, as was
pointed out by Lakatos in the Introduction to PR. However, this drawback
does not detract from Lakatos’s position as his focus was on theory change
rather than precise historiography, evidenced by his remark that “informal,
quasi-empirical mathematics does not grow through a monotonous increase
of the number of indubitably established theorems, but through the incessant
improvement of guesses by speculation and criticism, by the logic of proofs and
refutations” [Lakatos 1976, 5]. However, as Steiner emphasized, “this conclu-
sion tends to undermine ‘formalism’ (. . . )” [Steiner 1983, 503]. In the present
paper, our principal goal is to ﬁll in the gap between Lakatosian heuristics and
the formalism present in the counterexamples given in PR. Thus, the afore-
mentioned divergence from the actual history of the formula is not relevant to
the topic at hand.
Before beginning our exposition, we give a very short summary of the
methods of proofs and refutations. However, we do not go into a detailed
account of Lakatos’s methodology; the interested reader is advised to refer to
[Koetsier 1991] and [Kampis, Kvasz, Stöltzner 2002] for a more sophisticated
treatment of Lakatos’s methodology of proofs and refutations. Here, we use
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the exposition given by Corﬁeld in [Corﬁeld 2002]. The method of proofs and
refutations is comprised of the following methodological steps:
1. Primitive conjecture.
2. Proof (a rough thought experiment or argument, decomposing the prim-
itive conjecture into subconjectures and lemmas).
3. Global counterexamples.
4. Proof re-examined. The guilty lemma is spotted. The guilty lemma may
have previously been hidden or misidentiﬁed.
5. Proofs of the other theorems are examined to see if the newly found
lemma occurs in them.
6. Hitherto accepted consequences of the original and now refuted conjec-
ture are checked.
7. Counterexamples are turned into new examples, and new ﬁelds of inquiry
open up.
In this work, our aim is to show the heuristic role of the counterexamples.
We identify how particular counterexamples helped to improve conjectures and
how these counterexamples are identiﬁed. We employ certain geometrical and
topological notions such as genus, connected component etc., in order to be as
mathematically precise as possible.
The present paper is organized as follows. First, we brieﬂy revisit the for-
mula in question and its Cauchy proof. Then, in the second part, by following
the train of thought followed by Lakatos himself in PR, we discuss the coun-
terexamples one by one and point out their heuristic functions. We conclude
by pointing out some possibilities for future work.
2 The Conjecture and the Proof
The main conjecture discussed in PR is the following:
V − E + F = 2,
where V,E and F denote the number of vertices, edges and faces respectively
for all regular polyhedra. This conjecture is often called the Descartes–Euler
conjecture for historical reasons. The integer which is the solution to the equa-
tion V −E +F for some polyhedron P is called the Euler characteristic of P .
The proof given in PR was due to Cauchy. Let us brieﬂy recall it
step by step.
Step 1 : Imagine that the polyhedron is hollow and made of a rubber sheet.
Cut out one of the faces and stretch the remaining faces onto a ﬂat surface
(or board) without tearing. In this process, V and E will not alter. Thus, we
have V − E + F = 1, since we have removed a face.
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Step 2 : The remaining map to be triangulated. Drawing diagonals for
those curvilinear polygons which we obtained after stretching, will not alter
V − E + F since E and F increase simultaneously.
Step 3 : Remove the triangles. This can be done in one of the two ways:
either one edge and one face are removed simultaneously; or one face, one
vertex and two edges are removed simultaneously.
At the end of this process, we end up with an ordinary triangle for which
V − E + F = 1 holds trivially.
However, observe that there are three lemmas that have been used implic-
itly throughout the proof.
Lemma (i) Any polyhedron, from which a face has been removed, can be
stretched ﬂat on a ﬂat surface.
Lemma (ii) In triangulating the map, a new face is obtained for every
new edge.
Lemma (iii) There are only two alternatives for removing a triangle out
of the triangulating map: the removal of one edge, or the removal of two edges
and a vertex. Furthermore, the ﬁnal result of this process will be a single
triangle.
These three lemmas play a rather signiﬁcant role in the proof. Thus, we
focus more on them now.
3 Counterexamples and Their Heuristic
Patterns
The ﬁrst counterexamples are directed to the three lemmas which were seen to
have been used in the above proof. We will categorize these counterexamples
by following the classiﬁcation which was employed in PR. The heuristic pat-
terns of each counterexample and refutation played a signiﬁcant role in PR,
and we clarify them here from a topological/mathematical perspective.
3.1 Local but not Global Counterexamples
Local counterexamples contradict the speciﬁc lemmas or constructions which
were used in the proof without being relevant to the main conjecture. We now
consider the method of proof and the lemmas used in the proof.
Removing a triangle from the ‘inside’ of the triangulized map
of the cube In removing a triangle from the ‘inside’ of the triangulized
map, one is able to remove a triangle without removing any single edge or
vertex. This, however, is not one of the two ways of removing a triangle given
in Lemma (iii), and since this lemma claimed these were the only ways to
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remove a triangle, this proves the lemma to be false. But, the Euler conjecture
clearly does hold for the cube. Thus, we see that this counterexample does
not refute the main conjecture but only a lemma which comprised part of its
proof. In order to handle this counterexample, a modiﬁcation of Lemma (iii)
is considered.
Modified lemma (iii) The new idea is to remove any boundary triangle
by exactly following the pattern described in the third lemma. Yet, another
counterexample was given which contradicts the modiﬁed Lemma (iii).
Counterexamples by disconnecting the network One can easily
remove the triangles by disconnecting the network. In this way, V − E + F
is reduced by 1 by the removal of two edges and no vertices. So, Lemma (iii)
again needs to be modifed to save the proof.
Second Modification of Lemma (iii) Remove the triangles in such a
way that V − E + F is not changed. Alternatively, we can modify the termi-
nology: we call boundary triangles those whose removal does not disconnect
the network. Equivalently, the triangles in our network can be numbered that
in removing them in the right order V −E +F will not change until we reach
the last triangle.
The role of this counterexample was to describe a way to remove the trian-
gles from the triangulized map of the polyhedron in such a way that the proof
will succeed. As previously observed, one cannot remove the triangles from
the inside of the ﬂat mapping. Thus, the role of this counterexample is that
of a positive heuristic as it helped us to prove what we set out to prove. The
positive heuristic role of this particular counterexample played a signiﬁcant
role in emphasizing the topological character of Cauchy’s proof. The underly-
ing reason for this is the fact that the polyhedron was manipulated adopting
a topological point of view, disregarding its metric qualities and quantities.
Whatever the size of an edge or a face of the polyhedron, the proof still applies.
But, what makes this speciﬁc proof applicable? The present counterexample
underlines the topological “simple connectedness” property of the proof since,
as soon as the planar network is simply connected, the removal of the trian-
gles from outside does not alter the simply connected character of the network.
Thus, the topological invariants of the network remain the same. Note that the
“removal” operation which makes the proof go smoothly is a homeomorphism.
Recall that a homeomorphism (or topological isomorphism) is an isomorphism
which preserves topological properties. A homeomorphism, thus, is a bijective
and bicontinuous function. As a result, homeomorphic topological objects
have the same topological properties. For instance, a sphere and a torus are
not homeomorphic, thus do not enjoy the same topological properties. In
conclusion, this lemma shows that the simple topological object is preserved
under homeomorphism, and in this particular case, the homeomorphism is the
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function of removing a triangle from outside of the planar network. Further,
this mapping does not violate the simpleness of the topological object.
3.2 Global Counterexamples
Global counterexamples contradict the main conjecture. Essentially, global
counterexamples, outside of any reference to the proof of the conjecture,
demonstrate that it is false. However, the ﬁrst global counterexample which
was given in PR was also local.
A pair of nested cubes A nested cube is a complex object which is
composed of two cubes one inside the other. Hence, it is a counterexample for
the ﬁrst lemma, since the nested cube cannot be stretched onto a plane after a
face has been removed from the inner polyhedron. Also, for the nested cube,
we have V − E + F = 4.
At this stage, the students in the ﬁctional class of Lakatos, disagreed on
whether a pair of nested cubes is a genuine polyhedron at all. Thus, they
altered some deﬁnitions of polyhedra in order to save the conjecture, and
suggested the following deﬁnitions.
Definition 1 A polyhedron is a solid whose surface consists of polygo-
nal faces.
Definition 2 A polyhedron is a surface consisting of a system of polygons.
Let us now see how these attacks on the conjecture can be evaluated from
a heuristic point of view. First, note that in order to deal with the case of the
nested cube, the protective belt of the hard core of the theory of polyhedra
was employed. This opened up a discussion on the deﬁnitions of polyhedron
in order to save the conjecture. The underlying motivation was the following.
In order to exclude the nested cube as a freak, or monster as Lakatos him-
self called it, it must be proven that the nested cube is not a polyhedron at
all. To accomplish this, one can deﬁne the polyhedron as a proof generated
concept. As long as the students stuck to the Cauchy proof, a rigorous and
precise deﬁnition of polyhedra was needed and thus this deﬁnition was de-
rived from the proof in such a way that the deﬁnition would not conﬂict with
the proof and any of its lemmas. Essentially, this is a very important notion
in Lakatos’s methodology of scientiﬁc research programs (MSRP, henceforth),
and this example is one of the examples Lakatos himself used in order to reject
the deductivist and Euclidean methodology of mathematics which he attacked
in Appendix 2 of PR, entitled “Deductivist Approach vs. Heuristic Approach”.
As Lakatos clearly and radically considered these concepts, we will not repeat
them here. However, we note that, for Lakatos, the proof was in fact needed
in order to shape the notion (or the deﬁnition) of the polyhedra.
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Heuristically speaking, these deﬁnitions must be classiﬁed as negative
heuristics, since they exclude some forms of geometric objects which lie be-
yond the given two deﬁnitions and thus restricted the class of objects to which
they apply. Notice that this revision of deﬁnitions seems to be an ad hoc. Af-
ter each counterexample, one might need to revise the deﬁnitions in order to
exclude the monsters. As might be expected, new counterexamples emerged
immediately after the new deﬁnitions were introduced.
Counterexamples to Definitions 1 and 2 A pair of two tetrahedra
which have an edge in common and another pair of two tetrahedra which
have a vertex in common serve as counterexamples to Deﬁnitions 1 and 2.
In PR, they were labeled as Counterexamples 2a and 2b. Observe that both
counterexamples ﬁt both deﬁnitions. Furthermore, for both counterexamples,
we observe that V − E + F = 3. In order to exclude these counterexamples,
an immediate revision of the deﬁnitions took place in a rather ad hoc manner.
Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 were very intuitive, so it is not surprising that coun-
terexamples to them were found. Counterexamples 2a and 2b were presented
in a way as to show that those deﬁnitions were much too restrictive, i.e. their
degree of negativity in terms of heuristic was too high. Being rather intuitive
but very weak notions, Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 included too many objects as being
regular polyhedra allowing some to serve as counterexamples.
We now try a new deﬁnition.
Definition 3 A polyhedron is a system of polygons arranged in such a way
that (1) exactly two polygons meet at every edge and (2) it is possible to go
from the inside of any polygon to the inside of any other polygon via a route
which never crosses any edge at a vertex.
It is easy to see that in the ﬁrst twin tetrahedron in our last counterex-
ample, there was an edge at which four polygons meet and in the second twin
tetrahedron it was impossible to get from the inside of a polygon of the upper
tetrahedron to the inside of another polygon of the lower tetrahedron without
traveling via a route which crosses some edge at a vertex.
As a consequence, Counterexamples 2a and 2b provided cause for a revision
of the proof generated concept of polyhedra and Deﬁnition 3 arose as a result
of the aforementioned revision. This was the protective belt of the theory
which intervened and protected the hard core of the theory by introducing
the Deﬁnition 3. The result was the Perfect Deﬁnition, which we denote by
Deﬁnition P.
Definition P. A polyhedron is a system of polygons for which the equation
V − E + F = 2 holds.
Deﬁnition P. is a rather deductivist deﬁnition which Lakatos would never
agree. We believe that this is the reason why PR contained further material.
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Even though, it was the perfect deﬁnition, the discussions on polyhedra did
not ﬁnish with its treatment. The question then becomes, why did Lakatos
include this ad hoc deﬁnition which was indeed very narrow, restricted and
heuristically weak? In our opinion, the underlying reason for the introduction
of Deﬁnition P. was for showing the fallacies of the Euclidean mathematical
tradition which Lakatos attacked in the Appendices of PR. Obviously, in the
very narrow domain described by Deﬁnition P., the Descartes–Euler conjec-
ture was trivially satisﬁed as the Deﬁnition P. reduced the Eulerness of the
polyhedra to a single formula, i.e. V −E+F = 2, which did nothing to explain
the global properties of Eulerness. Moreover, it should also be underlined that
this deﬁnition was proof-generated, and thus came after the proof. At the
ﬁrst glance, Deﬁnition P. seems to be a deductive concept. However, when
considering the fact that the Deﬁnition P. is proof generated, it is easy to see
that it cannot be a deductive notion. We believe that this move was a very
signiﬁcant accomplishment of Lakatos: he turned a deductive-looking concept
into a proof generated concept by revising the heuristic presentation.
The Urchin of Kepler The Urchin of Kepler is the original name for
the small stellated dodecahedron, and it was a counterexample due to the fact
that for this “polyhedron” V −E + F = −6. Yet, it satisﬁed Deﬁnition 3.
One of the most interesting counterexamples of PR was deﬁnitely the
urchin. It was proposed to refute Deﬁnition 3. So, by the rules of negative
heuristics, Deﬁnition 3 was revised to exclude the urchin.
It was clear that Deﬁnition 3 needed to be revised after the urchin was
introduced. In order to exclude the urchin, another new deﬁnition, Deﬁnition
4, is proposed.
Definition 4 A polygon is a system of edges arranged in such a way that
(1) exactly two edges meet at every vertex, and (2) the edges have no points
in common except the vertices.
With Deﬁnition 4, the problem of the urchin was avoided since, in the
urchin, the edges have common points beyond the vertices. Consequently,
Deﬁnition 4 was modiﬁed again in order to “save” the urchin.
Definition 4’ A polygon is a system of edges arranged in such a way that
exactly two edges meet at every vertex.
In order to save the urchin, a new version of the deﬁnition of the polyhedra
appeared, which was Deﬁnition 4’. This deﬁnition was again a product of
negative heuristics, since it excluded a clause of the previous deﬁnition and
restricted the concept of a polygon even further. The proponent of Deﬁnition
4’ gave a brilliant explanation in order to justify Deﬁnition 4, viz. that one
should consider the polygons in space not in the plane. In that way, he thought,
the second clause of Deﬁnition 4 becomes useless, since “what you think to be
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a point in common is not really one point, but two diﬀerent points lying one
above the other” [Lakatos 1976, 17].
Clearly, the increase in the spatial dimensions reﬂects a topological intu-
ition. The lines which intersect in two dimensions may not intersect in three
dimensions. One can approach this naive observation from low-dimensional
topology or even from linear algebra of vector spaces.
Area of the urchin An attempt at solving the problem of the urchin was
made by pointing out the null areas of some polygons inside it. Urchin was
tried to be refuted by indicating the null areas of the some polygons in it.
However, this attack was parried by a disregard for the connection between
the “idea of area” and the “idea of polygon”.
This refutation was again via a negative heuristic following the Popperian
tradition. However, mathematically speaking this metric approach to geomet-
ric objects is far from being a topological approach. As soon as the concept of
area is introduced as a quantity, one might ignore, for instance, the degenerate
polygons. In other words, two objects might be homeomorphic but might have
diﬀerent areas. For example, consider two cubes, one having area a, the other
having area 2a. Clearly, these two cubes are homeomorphic, but their areas
are diﬀerent.
The problem of null areas can also be considered from a topological point
of view. Null areas appear when we have a dimension lacking such that some
regions are still covered. It is essentially similar to the crossing lines problem
which we discussed above.
The next counterexample we will discuss is the picture frame.
The Picture frame The picture frame was a counterexample to Deﬁnition
4 and Deﬁnition 4’. It satisﬁes all the deﬁnitions but for the picture frame we
have V − E + F = 0. Immediately after this observation, the picture frame
was handled by a new deﬁnition of polyhedra.
Definition 5 In the case of a genuine polyhedron, through any arbitrary
points in space, there is at least one plane whose cross-section with the poly-
hedron consists of a single polygon.
The picture frame satisﬁed all of the deﬁnitions hitherto proposed. How-
ever, it had an Euler characteristic of 0. It should be recalled that the picture
frame had a “hole”, and can only be inﬂated onto a torus. The reason for this
is that a torus has only one hole, or more properly speaking, a torus is of genus
one. More precisely, one can always ﬁnd a homeomorphism between a picture
frame and a torus. Thus, the topological properties of a torus and a picture
frame are identical. Therefore, it would not be too strange to expect that the
picture frame might be handled in some way via these properties. Deﬁnition 5
served for this purpose. It emphasized the simple connectedness requirement
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for Descartes–Euler polyhedra. Observe that if a point is taken in the picture
frame, a plane whose cross-section with the picture frame consists of a single
polygon does not exist.
Nonetheless, Deﬁnition 5 is not the ﬁnal deﬁnition. The following coun-
terexamples challenge Deﬁnition 5.
Cylinder The cylinder was a counterexample to Deﬁnition 5 and all other
deﬁnitions presented hitherto. The cylinder was labeled Counterexample 5
since V −E + F = 1 for it. The “unusual structure” of the cylinder was given
attention in the following discussion on the concept of an edge. It was then
claimed that the cylinder cannot be a counterexample to the deﬁnitions of a
polyhedron, since it was inconsistent with the proper deﬁnition of an edge. As
a result, a new deﬁnition of an edge was proposed.
Definition 6 An edge has two vertices.
The cylinder was addressed in the discussion of the proof-generated concept
of an edge. We observe that by deﬁning an edge, the cylinder was excluded
from being a polyhedron by the methods of negative heuristics. Nevertheless,
this is not the ﬁnal step. The consequent deﬁnition of an edge in this respect
can be considered a product of positive heuristics as well. By subsequently
discussing the deﬁnition of an edge, Lakatos demonstrated precisely how his
MSRP worked. One negative heuristic can indeed be followed by a positive
heuristic move in such a way that, similar to the Hegelian dialectics, a new
concept would be generated.
Having discussed the defining terms such as an edge, the discourse now
proceeded onto one of the most signiﬁcant aspects of Lakatosian heuristics.
Let us now brieﬂy review one such aspect, monster-barring.
The Method of Monster-Barring “Using this method one can elimi-
nate any counterexample to the original conjecture by a sometimes deft but
always ad hoc redeﬁnition of the polyhedron, [or] of its deﬁning terms, or of
the deﬁning terms of its deﬁning terms” [Lakatos 1976, 23].
As Lakatos indicated in PR, the method of monster-barring is “always ad
hoc”. In monster-barring, we may theoretically redeﬁne the terms recursively,
i.e. we ﬁrst start with the terms and deﬁne them, and then deﬁne the terms
that deﬁned the original term and so on. Therefore, the process of deﬁnining
becomes ad hoc, and we may need another tool to get ourselves out of this
vicious circle of ad hocness. This is precisely what Lakatos wanted us to do.
Nonetheless, the method of monster-barring does not necessarily yield pos-
itive heuristics. This is because, it can be used to avoid the counterexamples
or similarly to improve the conjecture by polishing the deﬁning terms.
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A New Statement of the Theorem For all polyhedra that have no
cavities, no tunnels and no “multiple structures”, we have V − E + F = 2.
This new statement excludes all monsters, i.e. exceptions. Yet, this pro-
cess, as we pointed out, is ad hoc. Although it did exclude all the exceptions,
we might not be able to determine whether this is true. In fact, as was re-
marked in PR, the urchin and the cylinder are counterexamples to this new
statement of the theorem.
It is also worthwhile to underline that the method of monster-barring for-
gets about the proof. Instead, it focuses on the deﬁnitions, its domain and
its truth sets—the objects that satisfy the conjecture. As was said in PR, in
monster-barring, “by suitably restricting both conjecture and the proof to a
proper domain, the conjecture, which is now true, will be perfected, and the
basically sound proof, which is now rigorous, will be perfected and obviously
will contain no more false lemmas” [Lakatos 1976, 29].
Let us now brieﬂy review an application of monster-adjustment which “ad-
justed” the urchin. In other words, the deﬁning terms of the monster (urchin)
were redeﬁned in such a way that the monster became a regular.
Method of Monster-Adjustment on the Urchin It was claimed
that there were no star-polygons in the urchin, but only triangular faces.
60 faces, 90 edges and 32 vertices give an Euler characteristic of 2. It was
then concluded that the urchin is a polyhedron and is Eulerian as well. How-
ever, its star-polyhedral interpretation was faulty.
Recall that on the ﬁrst interpretation of the urchin, it was claimed that its
faces were star-polygon. In order to be able to utilize positive heuristics, it was
then claimed that the urchin had triangular faces. Thus, this interpretation
yielded the observation that the urchin was in fact Eulerian with the appropri-
ate calculations. Yet, some objections were given against the monster-barring
interpretation of the urchin. Since all of its triangles lie on the same plane in
the groups of ﬁve and thus surround a regular pentagon behind the solid angle,
it was claimed that the triangular interpretation was false. In this case, these
objections played the role of positive heuristics as all of the interpretations
or misinterpretations exposed what the urchin really was and how it should
have been truly understand. Positive heuristics again helped us how and in
which direction we should proceed. In this speciﬁc example, we were told how
to analyse the urchin, and how to apply it to the Euler conjecture by these
positive heuristics.
Discussions on Geometrical Topology Having discussed the monster
adjustment, a naive geometrical topological approach is laid out. The picture
frame was considered ﬁrst in this regard. It was concluded that the picture
frame cannot be inﬂated into a sphere or a plane. The reason for this is that
the genus of the sphere is zero, and this is true even under the planar inter-
pretation of stretching. Namely, it was topologically the “same” to stretch the
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polyhedra onto the [Euclidean] plane or onto the sphere. In other words, a
homeomorphism between these two manifolds exists. From this, it was con-
cluded that the picture frame could be inﬂated into a torus. It should now be
recalled that the torus has genus one. Therefore, the general formula of Euler
characteristics in manifolds is:
v − e+ f = 2− 2.g(S)
where S is the surface onto which the polyhedron is being inﬂated.
For a torus S, we have the Euler characteristic V −E +F = 2− 2× 1 = 0
as mentioned earlier. Hence, it can be concluded that the picture frame is
not planar. This is the exact reason which made the picture frame a global
counterexample. Since the torus is not simply connected, it was argued that
the original conjecture holds only for simple polyhedra, namely for those which,
once one of their faces has been removed can be stretched onto a plane.
In this way, the domain of the conjecture and Lemma (i) gets restricted.
However, the proof still remains the same.
This interpretation of the picture frame in this context is a positive heuris-
tic. Apparently, by the introduction of the concepts of torus and that of genus,
we were shown how to interpret the picture frame correctly. Thus, we observe
that the positive heuristics introduced us to a new concept of genus in order
to allow us to interpret the non-simple polyhedra precisely. The conjecture
was improved and thus we ended up with a new formulation.
Yet, this does not mark the end of the counterexamples. The next such
counterexample is called a crested cube.
Crested Cube Counterexample 6 was the crested cube. It agreed with all
the deﬁnitions hitherto proposed, in that it had no cavities, tunnels or multiple
structures. Yet, the Euler characteristic of the crested cube was 3.
The crested cube was handled by modifying Lemma (ii). Consequently, the
original conjecture was modiﬁed by incorporating the new version of Lemma
(ii) as follows: For a simple polyhedron, with all its faces simply connected,
V − E + F = 2. Thus, in this case, “even though [proofs] may not prove,
[they] help [us] to improve the conjecture” [Lakatos 1976, 37]. From this ob-
servation of Lakatos, we conclude that the restriction on Lemma (ii) was a
positive heuristic since this restriction let us understand the proof better, and
thus improve it with a modiﬁed lemma. In this speciﬁc case, the sides of the
crested cube were interpreted as ring-shaped faces. Therefore, the simply-
connectedness condition excluded the crested cube as it had sides which were
not simply-connected. However, it was then claimed that the ring-shaped face
interpretation was misleading. So, we were told by negative heuristic that, this
was a misinterpretation and we should reject it, and that the crested cube is a
genuine counterexample to the Euler conjecture. “The misinterpretation inter-
pretation” again utilizes the observation that in lower dimensional manifolds,
faces which would not intersect in higher dimensions might intersect.
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All these discussions resulted in the following formulation of the theorem.
A New Formulation of the Theorem All polyhedra are Eulerian,
which (a) simple, (b) have each face simply connected, and (c) are such that
the triangles in the planar triangular network, which results from the processes
of stretching and triangulating, can be so numbered that, in removing them
in the right order, V −E + F will not change until we reach the last triangle.
In this formulation the lemmas have been turned into conditions.
The ultimate application of the method of lemma incorporation yielded
a new formulation of the theorem. This formulation was, without doubt, a
positive heuristic, since it explicitly and clearly revealed what a polyhedron
was and to which objects the Euler conjecture applied. Note that, in this
new formulation, all the lemmas we discussed previously were turned into
conditions. In other words, the “facts” we used in the proof were discussed
and found suspicious, and then, in order to alleviate the suspicion, they were
pushed to the meta-level as conditions of the theorem.
However, the method of the lemma incorporation suﬀers from an old prob-
lem, that is the problem of induction. How can one ensure that we have
incorporated all the lemmas into the formula as conditions?
Hidden Lemmas It was claimed that there were some hidden lemmas in
some of the mathematical formulations such as “all triangles have three edges
and vertices”. In the method of lemma incorporation, one must include all
lemmas. However, in this way, the problem of inﬁnite regress appears: how
can one determine where to stop turning lemmas into conditions?
From the heuristic point of view, we observe that positive heuristics told
us that we must include and incorporate the lemmas into the formula in order
to properly apply this method. However, in practice, we included only the
lemmas for which we had counterexamples thus far. Ad hocness thus still
remains although we adopted a new method.
3.3 Global but not Local Counterexamples
Cylinder Again The cylinder, it was observed, served as a counterexample
for both the naive conjecture and the theorem. Therefore, it is a global but not
a local counterexample since it refutes the theorem, but not the lemmas. The
problem appears when one tries to inﬂate the cylinder onto a plane by removing
the side face (the jacket). At this point, it seems that the cylinder should
satisfy another lemma: the resulting planar network needs to be connected.
But it turned out that this was a hidden assumption.
Moreover, it was claimed that the cylinder did not satisfy lemma (ii), viz.
that is “any face dissected by a diagonal falls into two pieces”. The counter
argument that followed immediately was the observation that, since one cannot
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draw a diagonal on circular faces, the cylinder should satisfy the lemma. It
was then observed that this interpretation of diagonalization did not follow
from the proof due to the fact that it was impossible to arrive at a triangular
network and conclude the proof.
We ﬁrst observe that the problem of cylinder was avoided by a positive
heuristic rule which says that, in the proof, the resulting network should be
connected. On the other hand, a negative heuristic told that we should not
remove the side face to obtain a planar network. So, in the case of the cylinder,
both heuristic patterns are used. A similar procedure goes for the applicability
of Lemma (ii) since we cannot draw a diagonal inside a circle. This discussion
might lead to the proof generated concept of diagonal addressing the question
of whether it can be drawn on a circle or not.
3.4 Returning to the Local but not Global
Counterexamples
Problem of Content “Proof-analysis, when increasing certainty, decreases
content. Each new lemma in the proof analysis, corresponding to a new condi-
tion in the theorem, reduces its domain.” [Lakatos 1976, 57] Another student
then introduced the following terminology: Quasi-convex polyhedra are poly-
hedra which have at least one face from which we can photograph inside of
the polyhedron. One should notice that this interpretation is quite similar to
the notion of inﬂating the polyhedra onto the sphere. In response to this, the
theorem next suggested by the student was “All quasi-convex polyhedra with
simply-connected faces are Eulerian”. Consider the great stellated dodecahe-
dron. For this polyhedron, we have V −E+F = 2. It was then proposed that
a proof must explain the phenomenon of Eulerianness in its entirety. This is
because it was not possible to imagine a proof that would explain the Eulerian
character of both convex and concave polyhedra, e.g. the cube and the great
stellated dodecahedron respectively, by one single idea. This is to say, the
conditions of the theorem were not only suﬃcient, but also necessary. There
must not be any counterexamples in its domain and likewise there must not
be any examples outside its domain.
One student thought that the problem was to discover the domain of truth
of V −E+F = 2. But another disagreed, as for him the problem was to discover
the relations between V , E, and F ; not only in the case where V −E+F = 2,
but also when V −E +F = 0, V −E +F = −6, etc. They then observed that
the picture frame with ring-shaped faces both in the front and in the back is
Eulerian, but is not a Cauchy polyhedron.
Therefore, in discussing both the inductive and the deductive basis of the
method of proofs and refutations, they set out to discuss as well the relations
between edges and vertices in polygons.
The idea of deductive reasoning was considered next. The student with
this idea performed a pasting on polyhedra which is called Connected Sum in
topology. He explains [Lakatos 1976, 76]:
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Take two closed normal polyhedra and paste them together along
a polygonal circuit so that two faces that meet disappear. Since
for the two polyhedra V − E + F = 4, the disappearance of two
faces in the united poyhedron will just restore the Euler formula.
(. . . ) [Then], let us now try a double-pasting test: let us paste
the two polyhedra together along two polygonal circuits. Now 4
faces will disappear and for the new polyhedron V − E + F = 0.
V − E + F = 2− 2× (n− 1) +
F∑
k=1
ek
Going on in this way he concluded that:1
For a monospheroid polyhedron V − E + F = 2, for a dispheroid
polyhedron V − E + F = 0, (. . . ) for a n-spheroid polyhedron
V − E + F = 2− 2× (n− 1).
The immediate counterexample is the crested cube with V − E + F = 1,
recalled by Omega. But Zeta thinks that his method may not be applied
to all poyhedra, but only to all n-spheroidal polyhedra built up according to
his construction. Now, Sigma argues about the polyhedra with ringshaped
faces. For him, it is possible to construct a ringshaped polygon by deleting in
a suitable proof-generated system of polygons an edge without reducing the
number of faces. Then, he concludes with the formula:
V − E + F = 2− 2× (n− 1) +
K∑
j=1
{2− 2× (nj − 1) +
F∑
k=1
ekj}
From a heuristic point of view, we remark that the distinctions and the
interaction between positive and negative heuristics are used to determine the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions of a mathematical theorem, the Descartes–
Euler conjecture. However it would be too hasty to draw the conclusion that
positive heuristics corresponds to necessary conditions whereas negative heuris-
tics correspond to sufficient conditions, or vice versa. Thus, we avoid making
this inference for the time being.
The problem of content is concerned with the task of containing every
genuine polyhedron in its domain and excluding every counterexample. As
we already pointed out, the tools that were used were primarily positive and
negative heuristics. Occasionally, they helped to enlarge and restrict the do-
main. It is not clear for Lakatos whether they have pre-deﬁned and pre-
determined tasks.
However, since Lakatos disagrees with Euclidean methodology consider-
ably, we can not expect Lakatos to give deﬁnite tasks for both heuristic rules.
1. Omega, Sigma and Zeta are the names of the students in Lakatos’s imaginary
classroom.
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This is precisely the reason why we avoid drawing conclusions too quickly
about the correspondence between “suﬃcient and necessary conditions” and
“negative and positive heuristics”.
One of the signiﬁcant ideas that Lakatos used in PR was the interpretation
of the Euler characteristic as a function. This idea was stated by one of the
students in Lakatos’s imaginary classroom. This positive heuristic approach
enabled us to understand the domain of the Euler characteristic better. In
this way, not only some speciﬁc integers that the Euler characteristic function
returned are considered, but in addition, any integer that can be the output of
the function is considered. Hence, in hindsight, it is not surprising that such
long and sophisticated formulas were present in the preceding pages. They
were the products of positive heuristics and led us to all polyhedral objects
with our formulation.
Lakatos concluded PR by a rather optimistic motto which we treat in the
following section.
3.5 How Criticism may Turn Mathematical Truth
into Logical Truth
In the last part of PR, Lakatos’s optimism reveals itself via his conclusion with
an observation about “stretching”.
New Version of the Theorem At this stage, a new version of the
theorem was put forward: “For all simple objects with simply-connected faces
such that the edges of the faces terminate in vertices V −E+F = 2”. However,
an immediate refutation, namely the twin tetrahedron, was given. In inﬂating
the twin tetrahedron, the critical edge is split into two edges.
Definition 7 Stretching is a bicontinuous one-to-one mapping. Disagree-
ments about its deﬁnition were centered on stretching a square along its bound-
aries. After a few discussions on the concept of simply connectedness the ses-
sion ended. One student remarked “(. . . ) now I have nothing but problems”
[Lakatos 1976, 80].
3.6 Heuristics and Necessitation
Thus far, we have not given a precise deﬁnition of the notions of positive and
negative heuristics. We will brieﬂy recall their deﬁnitions now in order to
conﬁrm that our exposition agreed with them.
Lakatos informally deﬁned negative heuristics as “the methodological rule
(. . . ) [which] tells us what paths of research to avoid”; and similarly stated
that positive heuristics “tells us what paths [of research] to pursue” [Lakatos
1978, 47]. However, in the present paper, our goal is not to elaborate on the
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concepts of negative and positive heuristics nor on their relations with the
hard core of the theory. Thus, we refer the interested reader to the original
paper of Lakatos for detailed discussion and exposition [Lakatos 1978].
Kiss remarked that “the aim of heuristic investigations is to ﬁnd themethod
of thinking, the rules by which one can receive results more easily and surely”
[emphasis is hers] [Kiss 2002, 243]. Our goal in this respect is not much
diﬀerent from that of Kiss. However, based on our present case study, we
refrain ourselves from giving a formal account of positive and negative heuris-
tics which depends on the mathematical necessitation. As was noted by one of
Lakatos’s colleagues, PR “removes the last Aristotelian element, the element
of necessitation, from modern science” [Feyerabend 1975, 14]. In this paper,
we have attempted to document why and how PR removed necessitation from
topological reasoning.
One of the reasons for this is the fact that some thought experiments and
counterexamples had the function both of negative and of positive heuristics
which prevented us from concluding the role of these thought experiments and
counterexamples with respect to the Aristotelian notion of necessitation. This
point also agrees with Lakatos’s thesis that mathematics is a quasi-empirical
science. In other words “nothing in mathematics is self-evident. Self-evidence
in mathematics is an illusion” [emphasis is his] [Koetsier 1991, 24].
However, we can pursue Lakatosian methodology further in order to for-
malize the logic of heuristics by diverging a bit from the actual philosophical
notions. Recent work in epistemic logic seems to give hints regarding the logic
of heuristics by utilizing modal operators for necessitation [Başkent 2007].
However, it is far from being precise in terms of Lakatosian MSRP. Therefore,
the modal logical tool at hand—assuming that modal logic is an appropriate
tool for formalizing necessitation—is still far from giving a precise and formal
account of Lakatosian heuristics.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
The main aim of this paper was to identify the counterexamples in PR and to
discuss whether they play the role of positive heuristics or negative heuristics
or both by using some simple and intuitive ideas of geometric topology.
While we were treating Lakatos’s philosophy and methodology of mathe-
matics (as he outlined in the Appendices of PR), we refrained from making
clear-cut distinctions between the two types of heuristics. This is because, we
observed that this distinction would mistakenly lead us to make a similar type
of distinction between the correspondence of positive heuristic to the necessary
conditions of a theorem and the correspondence of negative heuristic to the
suﬃcient conditions of a theorem. The main reason in our view that Lakatos
did not make that kind of distinction lies in the fact that Lakatos did not
disagree with the rule of double negation and hence the method of Reductio
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Ad Absordum [Lakatos 1976]. Therefore, any utilization of intuitionistic and
thus modal logical tools to formalize Lakatosian heuristics will be doomed to
failure since they cannot be perfectly consistent with these heuristic notions.
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